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Abstract
The access pricing problem emerges when a vertically integrated ﬁrm (the
incumbent) provides an essential service in the upstream market, to an entrant.
Both ﬁrms produce a ﬁnal service and compete in the downstream market.
The standard treatment of this problem has been to add the access price to
the list of instruments available to a regulator who maximizes a social welfare
function. Motivated by the international trend to reduce the number of prices
set by regulation, we use a light handed regulation approach in which the
only tool available to the regulator is the access price, and where retail prices
are set by quantity competition in the downstream market. In this setup,
we ﬁnd that a regulator seeking to maximize total market surplus will set an
access price that subsidizes the entrant, so that entrants that are less eﬃcient
than the incumbent ﬁrm can survive in the market. We then compare the
outcomes of the full regulation model with those of the light-handed regulation
model, in terms of ﬁnal prices, ﬁrm proﬁts, and consumer surplus. When the
regulator faces incomplete information about entrant ﬁrms’ costs and cannot
oﬀer a menu of contracts to potential entrants, we ﬁnd examples in which light
handed regulation can dominate full regulation.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The access pricing problem arises when a vertically integrated multiproduct ﬁrm (the
incumbent) provides an essential input (e.g., local telephone network) to another ﬁrm
1(the entrant) which produces a ﬁnal or retail service with it (e.g., long distance tele-
phone service). The incumbent also uses the essential input to provide a retail service
that may be diﬀerent from the entrant’s. Hence, while the entrant is a client of the
incumbent at the input level, it is a competitor at the ﬁnal service level. It is usu-
ally assumed that the essential service has natural monopoly characteristics, hence,
price(s) of access to the network are regulated. In practice, this problem has be-
come increasingly common as many countries have opened some segments of network
industries to competition (e.g. long distance telephony, electricity generation).
The standard treatment of the access pricing problem in the literature is to incor-
porate the price of the essential intermediate good into a scheme of regulation that
uses prices, quantities, cost levels, and transfers as instruments. In this context, the
access price will reﬂect the marginal cost of the network, as well as a contribution to
covering the ﬁxed costs of the network. In addition, if the regulator faces asymmetric
information about the incumbent’s cost structure, the access price will contain part
of the informational rents provided to induce truthful revelation of costs.1 An im-
portant and much discussed access pricing rule is the eﬃcient component pricing rule
(ECPR), which roughly states that the access price must compensate the incumbent
for the opportunity costs of access.2. The ECPR generally precludes entry when po-
tential entrants are less eﬃcient than the incumbent ﬁrm. Critics of this rule (e.g.
Economides and White 1995,1998) have argued that competition provides beneﬁts
that may make even less eﬃcient entrants desirable.
From our perspective there are two main objections to this dominant approach
to the access pricing problem. First, competition itself does not provide beneﬁts,
and only increases social welfare or surplus if the entrant(s) are more technically
eﬃcient than the incumbent ﬁrm. Second, in practice we do not observe regulators
having access (or using) such a wide array of regulatory instruments as are used in
the literature on regulation. In fact, regulators have been moving towards schemes in
which they use fewer instruments. For example, New Zealand has adopted a regime of
no direct regulation of access prices or ﬁnal prices, and relies entirely on competition
law to avoid abuse, collusion, or discrimination in access pricing negotiations.3 In
Australia, the regulatory authority does not set ﬁnal prices, and competitors negotiate
the access price. The regulator only intervenes if negotiations break down. A similar
setup prevails in the US.4.
This paper attempts to deal with these objections ﬁrst by considering a model in
which the regulator only sets the price at which an incumbent ﬁrm sells an essential
intermediate input to a potential entrant to the market. In this setup we ﬁnd that
the access price will have very diﬀerent characteristics as compared with a regulatory
framework in which access price is used as one of several regulatory instruments. In
1For a general treatment of the access pricing problem in this vein see Laﬀont and Tirole (1994).
2See Baumol and Sidak (1995).
3See Economides (1999).
4See Economides (1998).
2particular, we ﬁnd that the access price may not cover the marginal cost of producing
the intermediate good (operating the network), thereby providing a subsidy to the
entrant ﬁrm. In general, the regulator will oblige the incumbent ﬁrm to provide a
greater subsidy to the entrant as the entrant ﬁrm becomes more eﬃcient.5
Our second goal is to compare total market surplus under a light handed regulatory
regime, in which only the access price is set by the regulator, with respect to a fully
regulated regime, in which the access price and ﬁnal quantities sold in the downstream
market are determined by regulation. If there are situations in which light handed
regulation dominates, then there may be theoretical justiﬁcation for the observed
shift towards fewer regulatory instruments. In the context of this second objective, we
make two crucial assumptions. First, the regulator does not have perfect information
about the cost structure of potential entrants; and second, the regulator can oﬀer a
menu of regulatory contracts to the incumbent ﬁrm, but not to the potential entrant.
This assumption is equivalent to forcing the regulator to use all the instruments at
her disposal. For example, if there is only one type of incumbent, only one contract of
access price and ﬁnal quantities can be oﬀered under full regulation; it is not possible
to set only the access price and provide alternative sets of quantities for each available
access price. In other words, we assume that if legislation provides the regulator with
a particular instrument, this may not imply wide discretion in the use (or non-use)
of the instrument.
T h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c et h a tc o u r t sc a nr e ad regulatory statutes narrowly in order
to reduce the discretion a regulator has in the use of its regulatory instruments. Also,
courts tend to overturn sections of statutes that appear to grant unchecked discretion
to administrative agencies. An important case in this respect is MCI Telecommuni-
cations Corp. vs. AT & T Co.(1994),6 in which the US Supreme Court ruled that
the Federal Communications Commission could not allow non-dominant ﬁrms to stop
posting their rates, even though the relevant statute provided for modiﬁcations to the
rate posting process to be made by the FCC at its own discretion.
Given these assumptions, we ﬁnd that full regulation always dominates light
handed regulation, from the social perspective, when there is no uncertainty about
the entrant’s cost structure. However, with uncertainty about potential entrants’
costs, light handed regulation may dominate full regulation. We cannot yet charac-
terize generally the situations in which this result holds. However we provide some
examples, with or without an intermediate good and with or without asymmetric
information about the incumbent ﬁrm’s costs, in which light handed regulation can
dominate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a basic model in
which ﬁrms may compete in Cournot fashion in the downstream market, or quantities
can be set by regulation. We compare access pricing rules under the two regimes
derived by unconstrained total surplus optimization with perfect information. Section
5Our results in this regard are very similar to those of Lewis and Sappington (1999).
6512 U.S. 218.
33 compares the outcomes of full and light handed regulation under asymmetric and
incomplete information about incumbent and entrant costs, respectively. Section 4
concludes.
2B a s i c M o d e l
We consider a model with only two ﬁrms, the incumbent and a potential entrant.
The incumbent is a vertically integrated ﬁrm that produces an essential intermediate
good (such as a local distribution network), which it uses to produce a ﬁnal good or
service. An entrant to this market must purchase the intermediate good from the
incumbent ﬁrm in order to produce the ﬁnal good. We assume that the intermediate
good is not sold directly to consumers; it is only used by the incumbent and entrant
ﬁrms to produce their ﬁnal goods. For each unit of ﬁnal good it wishes to produce,
each ﬁrm needs exactly one unit of the intermediate good. The access price is the
price at which the incumbent sells the intermediate good to the entrant.
A regulator in this market seeks to maximize total surplus from the market,
deﬁned as the (unweighted) sum of net consumer surplus and the proﬁts of ﬁrms
in the market. We consider two regulatory regimes: ”full regulation”, in which the
regulator sets the access price and the quantities produced by each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal
market, and ”light handed regulation” in which the regulator sets only the access
price. In the latter regulatory environment, we assume that ﬁrms compete setting
quantities simultaneously in the ﬁnal market.
Regulatory interaction is often modeled as a problem of asymmetric information.
We consider situations in which the regulator has perfect information about the in-
cumbent’s cost function, as well as situations in which the incumbent ﬁrm has private
information about its costs. With respect to the entrant’s costs, we generally assume
that the regulator has incomplete information. The potential entrant holds private
information about its costs. However, we allow the regulator to oﬀer a menu of ac-
cess prices and quantities to the incumbent, but not to the potential entrant. Hence,
incompleteness of information regarding the entrant’s costs cannot be addressed by
standard contracting techniques to solve problems of adverse selection.
Under full regulation, the regulator faces a participation constraint for each ﬁrm.
In particular, we assume that the regulator cannot set the quantity of either ﬁrm to
be strictly positive, at a market price that results in negative proﬁts for the ﬁrm.
When the regulator faces asymmetric information about the incumbent’s costs, it
may oﬀer a menu of contracts to this ﬁrm in order to induce truthful revelation of
costs. In this case, the menu of contracts must satisfy incentive compatibility for
each possible type of incumbent. With respect to the entrant, we assume that the
regulator faces incomplete information, i.e. she does not know the cost function of
the potential entrant. Moreover, we assume that the regulator cannot contract with
the potential entrant. This means that for any set of quantities and access price set
4by the regulator and chosen in equilibrium by some type of the incumbent ﬁrm, any
possible type of entrant must have non-negative proﬁts.
Under light handed regulation, the regulator sets only the access price, and ﬁrms
interact a la Cournot in the downstream market. The regulator’s problem is solved by
backward induction; she sets the access price(s) to maximize total surplus from the
market, given the eﬀects of the access price on the outcomes of quantity competition
in the downstream market. Again the regulator faces a participation constraint for
both ﬁrms. Faced with asymmetric information about the incumbent ﬁrm’s costs,
the regulator can oﬀer a menu of contracts to induce truthful revelation by the in-
cumbent. In this case, each type of incumbent choosing the contract designed for his
type must have non-negative proﬁts. In addition, the set of contracts oﬀered must
satisfy incentive compatibility for the incumbent. With respect to the entrant, given
incomplete information, the market outcomes resulting from each access price chosen
by some type of the incumbent in equilibrium must include non negative proﬁts for
each possible type of entrant.
2.1 Assumptions
I n v e r s ed e m a n di sg i v e nb y
P = a − bQ;Q = q1 + q2.
There are two ﬁrms, the incumbent (1) and the entrant (2).
The ﬁrms sell homogeneous products in the downstream market.
Costs are given by
Ci = ciqi,i=1 ,2









,w h e r ec1 < c1 and c2 < c2.
The lower cost realizations of incumbent and entrant occur with probabilities α
and β, respectively.
For each unit of qi produced, one unit of q0 is required. The costs incurred by
ﬁrm 1 in production of the intermediate good are
C0 = c0q0 = c0 (q1 + q2)
The value of c0 is known to the regulator and to both ﬁrms. For each unit of this
intermediate good purchased by the entrant, the incumbent ﬁrm charges t.
Firm proﬁts are given by:
π1 =( a − bq1 − bq2 − c0 − c1)q1 +( t − c0)q2 (1)
π2 =( a − bq1 − bq2 − t − c2)q2 (2)






The regulator’s objective is to maximize total surplus, given by
TS = NCS+ π1 + π2 (4)
2.2 Comparison of access rules: Perfect information, no par-
ticipation constraints.
To illustrate the diﬀerence between the optimal access prices under full and light
handed regulation, we ﬁrst examine a special case of the model above, with perfect
information about both ﬁrms’ cost parameters, and no participation constraints for
either ﬁrm. In this subsection assume that c1 = c1 = c1 and c2 = c2 = c2. The as-
sumption of perfect information will clearly result in full regulation dominating light
handed regulation from the social perspective, particularly because light handed reg-
ulation includes imperfect competition between the ﬁrms in the downstream market.
Assuming that the regulator need not satisfy a budget constraint even for the in-
cumbent ﬁrm implies that under light handed regulation, the regulator can set the
access price very low in order to induce tougher competition between the entrant and
the incumbent ﬁrms. This assumption, while unrealistic, will make the diﬀerence
between optimal access pricing under the two regimes particularly stark.
Under full regulation, the regulator faces the following problem
Max
t,q1,q2





Note that here the regulator will be indiﬀerent with regard to the value of t,a si t
represents a transfer from the entrant to the incumbent ﬁrm. To solve this problem
the regulator will select only one ﬁrm to produce, unless c1 = c2, in which case
the regulator will set a market price and will be indiﬀerent as to the proportions of
the market served by each ﬁrm. Although the access price here is irrelevant to the
determination of total surplus, we can assume that the regulator will set t in order to
maintain zero proﬁts for the entrant whether or not its quantity is set to be positive.
Hence t = c0. This outcome is identical to the result of perfect competition in the
downstream market, with two available technologies, c1 and c2.
Under light handed regulation, the regulator sets only t and both ﬁrms take this
access price as given and compete in Cournot fashion in the downstream market.
Best response functions for the two ﬁrms will be:
q1 =
a − bq2 − c0 − c1
2b
;q2 =
a − bq1 − t − c2
2b
(6)
6Solving simultaneously results in
q1 =
a + t + c2 − 2c0 − 2c1
3b
;q2 =









(a + c0 + c1 + c2 + t) (8)
The regulator’s problem is now:
Max







where P,q1,q 2 are given by equations 7 and 8
The optimal access price is given by
t = −a +5 c2 +2 c0 − 4c1




1 − 6c1c2 +4 c2
2 + a2 − 2ac2 − 2ac0 +2 c2c0 + c2
0
b





a − c0 +3 c1 − 4c2
b
Note that in this regulatory regime the access price can be less than the marginal
cost of producing the intermediate good, i.e.
t<c 0 ⇐⇒ c0 +5 c2 − 4c1 <a
For example, if two ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient in the downstream market (c1 =
c2 = c), and the market is economically viable (c0 + c<a ), then the entrant will
be provided with a subsidy in the form of an access price that does not cover the
incumbent’s marginal cost of producing the intermediate good. Also notice that the
incumbent ﬁrm only produces a strictly positive quantity when it is more eﬃcient
than the entrant in the downstream segment. On the other hand, the entrant will
produce a strictly positive quantity when its costs in the downstream market are
equal to the incumbent’s. To illustrate this result, we graph, for a given value of c0,
the condition that determines whether the access price will imply a subsidy to the
entrant ﬁrm or not, and the conditions for which each ﬁrm will produce a positive
quantity. Figure 1 below shows these conditions for a =1 ,b=1 ,c 0 =0 .3.
The triangle outlined by the heavy black lines is the area in which both ﬁrms

















information and without constraints. Outside this area only one of the ﬁrms will
produce. The dotted line inside the triangle shows the values of the ﬁrms’ cost pa-
rameters for which the access price will exactly equal the marginal cost of producing
the intermediate good. Below this line the regulator will set an access price below
the marginal cost, thus subsidizing the entrant’s production. The intuition is simple:
with the access price as her only tool, the regulator can only increase total quantity
p r o d u c e di nt h em a r k e tb ym a k i n gt h ee n t r a n tm o r ec o m p e t i t i v e .R e d u c i n gt h ea c -
cess price diminishes the entrant’s costs of production and makes him behave more
aggressively in Cournot competition with the incumbent ﬁrm. This reduces the mar-
ket price and increases the total quantity produced in the market. However, this
policy tilts production towards the entrant, which is socially costly when the entrant
is less eﬃcient than the incumbent at producing the ﬁnal good. For this reason the
subsidy is reduced (access price increased) as the entrant becomes less eﬃcient or as
the incumbent becomes more eﬃcient. The optimal access price set by the regulator
results from the trade-oﬀ between the eﬃciency loss from having a less eﬃcient ﬁrm
produce and the eﬃciency gain from higher total production.
3 Full vs. light handed regulation under asymmet-
ric and incomplete information
We now consider the problem of a regulator under each of the full and light handed
regulatory regimes, given that the regulator may not know the type of the incumbent
or entrant ﬁrms. In this setup, the incumbent and the entrant hold private informa-
tion about their respective cost parameters, and both ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h er e g u l a t o r
know the probability distribution over cost parameters. In terms of constraints, we as-
8sume that the regulator must satisfy individual rationality (participation) constraints
for both ﬁrms, and if she chooses to oﬀer separating regulatory contracts, she must
satisfy incentive compatibility constraints for each type of incumbent ﬁrm.
We set up the regulator’s problem under each of these regimes. Then for the
special case where both incumbent and regulator know the cost parameter of any
potential entrant, we show that full regulation will dominate light handed regulation.
This result can also be shown in a much more general model that does not specify
demand functions, cost functions, or homogeneity of downstream goods.
Next we will argue that the proposition of full regulation dominance cannot be
proven when the regulator has incomplete information about the entrant’s costs, and
when it cannot oﬀer the entrant menus of regulatory contracts. Since no contracting
is possible with the potential entrant, the best mechanism the regulator has to extract
social surplus from the entrant is market interaction. Under some parameter settings,
the value of this information is greater than the additional informational rents the
regulator must give away to the low cost incumbent due to the reduced number of
instruments for contracting with the incumbent. We include several examples to
show situations in which light handed regulation does (or does not) dominate full
regulation.
3.1 Regulator’s problem
When setting the access price as well as the ﬁnal goods prices, the regulator seeks to








a − bq1 − bq2 − c0 − c1
¢
q1 +( t − c0)q2
+β
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Individual rationality constraints for incumbent
¡
a − bq1 − bq2 − c0 − c1
¢
q1 +( t − c0)q2 > 0 (10)




q2 > 0 (11)
Incentive compatibility constraints for incumbent
¡
a − bq1 − bq2 − c0 − c1
¢
q1 +( t − c0)q2 >
¡














a − bq1 − bq2 − c0 − c1
¢
q1 +( t − c0)q2
(13)
Individual rationality constraints for entrant
¡












a − bq1 − bq2 − t − c2
¢
q2 > 0 (14)





In a light handed regulation scheme, the regulator solves for the access price(s)
that will maximize expected total surplus given that ﬁrms interact in Cournot fashion
in the second stage of the game. As shown above for the case of perfect information,
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(a + c0 + c1 + c2 + t) − t − c2
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+( 1− β)π1 (t,c1,c2) (18)























3.2 No uncertainty about entrant: full regulation dominates
When the regulator knows the cost parameter of the potential entrant, she can extract
the social beneﬁts of entry by setting the entrant’s quantity adequately as a function
of his cost parameter. In other words, the only obstacle to replicating the competitive
outcome through regulation is now the private information held by the incumbent.
Given that the regulator can contract with the incumbent, the more variables the
regulator can set in the contract, the more cheaply she can extract the incumbent’s
private information. In this regard we make the following proposition.










that solves the regulator’s problem under the




and (q1,q2) as the
results of Cournot competition between the incumbent of type c1 and type c1 and the




6=( q1,q2) because each incumbent
11type will play the best response function corresponding to its true type. Now suppose































a − bq1 − bq2 − c0 − c1
¢
q1 +( t − c0)q2 > 0
Hence the individual rationality constraint for the type c1 incumbent is satisﬁed under
full regulation. Similarly, individual rationality is satisﬁed for the type c1 incumbent
and for the entrant. Note that under Cournot competition in the downstream market,
the entrant will have strictly positive proﬁts if it produces a positive quantity, as price
will exceed its marginal and average cost. Now consider the incentive compatibility























because (q1,q2) is the outcome of proﬁt maximizing behavior in the downstream mar-
ket for the type c1 incumbent, and not for the type c1 incumbent, and c1< c1.H e n c e ,
incentive compatibility for the type c1 incumbent will not bind under the fully reg-
ulated scheme. Similarly, incentive compatibility for the type c1 incumbent will not





, the regulator can increase expected total surplus by in-
creasing the quantity produced by the incumbent ﬁrm without violating any individual
rationality or incentive compatibility constraints.
It is important to notice that this argument cannot deliver a proof that full regula-
tion dominates light handed regulation in the social sense, when there is uncertainty
about the type of the entrant, and no (non-trivial) menu of contracts can be oﬀered
to the entrant. To understand why this is the case, consider following the same line
of proof with uncertainty about the type of entrant. Proﬁts for a particular type of











In order to oﬀer under full regulation a contract that replicates the expected proﬁt


































Hence a contract can be constructed under full regulation so that each type of
incumbent has exactly the same level of proﬁts by choosing the contract designed for
its type, as it achieves under the light handed regime. However, that contract may
not provide the same level of total surplus from the market.7, and may provide strictly
less total surplus than its light handed counterpart. The regulator can still improve
on this social surplus under full regulation, by the argument used above. However,
if the initial point under full regulation has strictly lower social surplus, it will not
be true in general that the optimal contract under full regulation will dominate the
optimal contract under light handed regulation.
Note that were the regulator allowed to use discretion in the exercise of full reg-
ulation instruments, she would always be able to improve social welfare by moving
to full regulation. For example, the regulator could oﬀer under full regulation two
possible access prices, but for each access price chosen it could provide a menu or
range of quantities that could be produced. In such a situation, the regulator could
easily replicate any result of optimal light handed regulation with a fully regulated
menu of contracts that provided the same levels of proﬁts to ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h es a m e
level of net consumer surplus. It could then improve on this full regulated menu
of contracts because incentive compatibility constraints would no longer bind under
full regulation. Thus, a crucial assumption for our results is that the fully regulated
regime allows but also imposes the use of more instruments.
3.3 Uncertainty about entrant’s costs: Examples of full and
light handed dominance
Here we provide three examples of full and light handed regulatory regimes, in which
the use of more regulatory instruments may improve total surplus or reduce total
surplus depending on parameters. This basic point can be shown in a model without
an intermediate input or access problem. We consider situations with and without an
intermediate good, and with or without perfect information about the incumbent’s
costs.
Example 1 No intermediate input, homogenous products Cournot interaction, per-
fect information about incumbent’s cost, incomplete information about potential en-
trant’s cost. No regulation dominates quantity regulation.
7The reason is simple. Both proﬁt functions and net consumer surplus are convex in prices, but
their degree of convexity may not be identical around the initial light handed regulation solution.
Hence it is possible that the (t,q1,q 2) under full regulation, for which the incumbent ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between full and light handed regulation contracts, is associated to strictly lower total surplus.
13Demand is given by Q =1 0− P;Q = q1 + q2.
Two ﬁrms, incumbent (1) and entrant (2).
No ﬁxed costs for incumbent or entrant ﬁrm.
c1 =4 .
c2 ∈ {2,6}, each occurring with probability 1
2
Total surplus is deﬁned as TS = NCS+ PS 1 + PS 2.
NCS = 1
2Q2;PS 1 = π1;PS 2 = π2 since there are no ﬁxed costs.
Under a no-regulation regime, two possible market outcomes occur with equal
probability:




Outcome 2: q1 = 4
3;q2 = 10
3 ;P = 16
3 ;TS ' 23.778.
Thus expected total surplus E(TS) ' 18.444.
Compare this with the best outcome under full regulation, i.e. setting quantities
for both ﬁrms. Note that the regulator cannot set a menu of contracts, as the in-
cumbent ﬁrm, whose cost is known, would choose the contract that oﬀers it higher
proﬁts. The entrant ﬁrm by assumption cannot contract with the regulator, hence it




















































The constraints imply that for qR
1 > 0, the regulator must provide qR
1 + qR
2 ≤
6 ⇐⇒ P ≥ 4.A l s o ,f o rqR
2 > 0, the regulator must provide qR
1 + qR
2 ≤ 4 ⇐⇒ P ≥ 6.
We are assuming that the regulator cannot set qR
2 > 0 and then allow the entrant
ﬁrm to choose between this value of qR
2 and qR
2 =0 . In other words, if the regulator
sets a positive quantity for the entrant, that means it must guarantee that entry will
occur, otherwise it must set zero quantity for the entrant.
Under these conditions, the regulator will choose qR
1 =6 ,qR
2 =0 .T h e e n t r a n t
has zero proﬁts, the incumbent has zero proﬁts, and NCS =1 8 . Hence, TS =
18 < 18.444 found above. Given the limitations (inﬂexibility) in the use of quantity
regulation as an instrument, surplus from this market is higher without any regulation
Example 2 No intermediate good, homogenous products Cournot interaction, asym-
metric information about incumbent’s cost, incomplete information about potential
entrant’s cost. Under slightly diﬀerent parameter settings, no regulation or quantity
regulation can dominate.
A g a i nd e m a n di sg i v e nb yQ =1 0− P;Q = q1 + q2.
The two ﬁrms’ costs are given by:
14c1 ∈ {3,5}, each occurring with probability 1
2
c2 ∈ {1,5}, each occurring with probability 1
2
Now under a no regulation regime, there will be four possible market outcomes,
each occurring with probability 1
4. The outcomes will be:
c1 = c2 =5= ⇒ q1 = 5
3;q2 = 5
3;P = 20
3 ;TS=1 1 .111.
c1 =5 ;c2 =1= ⇒ q1 = 1
3;q2 = 26
6 ;P = 32
6 ;TS =2 9 .778.
c1 =3 ;c2 =5= ⇒ q1 =3 ;q2 =1 ;P =6 ;TS =1 8 .
c1 =3 ;c2 =1= ⇒ q1 = 5
3;q2 = 22
6 ;P = 28
6 ;TS =3 0 .444.
Expected total surplus is then 22.333.




will be oﬀered in order to maximize
expected total surplus subject to the constraints:
Individual rationality for incumbent types
¡
7 − q1 − q2
¢
q1 > 0;(5 − q1 − q2)q1 > 0
Incentive compatibility for incumbent types
¡
7 − q1 − q2
¢
q1 > (7 − q1 − q2)q1;(5− q1 − q2)q1 >
¡
5 − q1 − q2
¢
q1
Individual rationality for entrant types
¡




5 − q1 − q2
¢
q2 > 0;(9 − q1 − q2)q2 > 0;(5 − q1 − q2)q2 > 0
The resulting contracts are
q1 =7 ;q2 =0 ;q1 =0 ;q2 =5
And resulting social surplus is 23.5, which dominates the result under no reg-
ulation. Notice that uncertainty about the incumbent’s cost parameter allows the
regulator here to use a menu with two sets of quantities, and the added ﬂexibility
in this particular case makes quantity regulation more attractive than no regulation.
Put another way, the use of more instruments becomes relatively more attractive as
asymmetric information with regard to the incumbent ﬁrm increases.
Now consider the same example, changing the entrant’s cost level to c2 ∈ {1,6},
again each occurring with probability 1
2. With no regulation, expected total surplus
falls to 21.9167. Under full regulation, the constrained optimal contracts will now be
q1 =7 ;q2 =0 ;q1 =0 ;q2 =4
and the associated expected total surplus is 21.25, so that now the no regulation
policy dominates quantity regulation. For some intuition on why the regulator cannot
improve on these contracts, consider the contract designed for the high cost incumbent
type. Given that this type of incumbent does not produce, the regulator cannot set the
entrant’s quantity above 4, because the high cost entrant would have negative proﬁts
15in that case. The regulator could increase the total quantity in the market by setting
the entrant’s quantity to zero and the incumbent’s at 5. This would improve total
surplus from the contract designed for the high cost incumbent. However, such a move
would cause incentive compatibility for the low cost incumbent to be violated, because
this type will now prefer the high cost contract. To maintain incentive compatibility,
the regulator would then have to oﬀer a pooling contract with no production by the
entrant and 5 units produced by either type of incumbent. Expected total surplus
would decrease to 17.5.
Example 3 Intermediate good, homogenous products Cournot interaction, perfect
information about incumbent’s cost, incomplete information about potential entrant’s
cost. Light handed regulation dominates full regulation
Once more demand is given by Q =1 0− P;Q = q1 + q2.
The two ﬁrms’ costs are given by:
c0 =2 ;c1 =4 .
c2 ∈ {1,5}, each occurring with probability 1
2.
Under light handed regulation, the quantities produced are given by 7 and 8 above.
Unconstrained maximization of total surplus results in a negative access price (t =
−7), which clearly violates both individual rationality and non-negative production
constraints. The constrained optimal access price is the access price that makes the
individual rationality constraint for the high cost incumbent bind. The constraint










hence t =1 .9689 and resulting expected total surplus is 11.975.
Under full regulation, the regulator will oﬀer (t,q1,q 2) to maximize total surplus
while satisfying one individual rationality constraint for the known type of incumbent,
and one individual rationality constraint for each type of entrant. The constraints
are then:
(4 − q1 − q2)q1 +( t − 2)q2 > 0
(5 − q1 − q2 − t)q2 > 0
(9 − q1 − q2 − t)q2 > 0
The regulator here can not do better than oﬀering the contract (t,q1,q 2)=( 2 ,0,3),
which yields expected total surplus of 10.5, less than the expected total surplus un-
der light handed regulation. Consider other possible contracts: the regulator could
set entrant’s quantity to zero, access price would become irrelevant, and the incum-
bent could produce as much as 4, an outcome that yields strictly lower total surplus.
To have both ﬁrms producing the regulator could oﬀer (t,q1,q 2)=( 1 .75,1.5,1.75),
but this would yield expected total surplus of 9.625 < 10.5. We conclude that light
handed regulation provides higher expected total surplus in this case. Our conjecture
at this point is that adding the intermediate good and access price to the regulator’s
16problem makes abandoning the quantity setting instruments relatively more attrac-
tive, because the regulator is still left with a tool that inﬂuences market outcomes.
However, we cannot yet show this as a general result.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have considered a model of light handed regulation, in which regu-
latory instruments available are reduced to the price at which a vertically integrated
incumbent ﬁrm grants entrants access to an essential input. We ﬁnd that in this
model the socially optimal access price generally provides a subsidy to entrant ﬁrms,
a n df a v o r se n t r a n t sm o r ea st h e ya r em o r ee ﬃcient with respect to the incumbent
ﬁrm.
We then compare expected total surplus, deﬁned as the unweighted sum of net con-
sumer surplus and producer surplus, under light handed and fully regulated regimes.
We ﬁnd that with perfect information about cost characteristics of potential entrants,
a larger number of regulatory instruments is always welfare-improving. However,
when the regulator has incomplete information about entrant costs, and cannot rem-
edy this complete information by providing the entrant with a menu of regulatory
contracts, then light handed regulation can dominate full regulation from the social
perspective.
This result indicates some motivation for the reduction of regulatory instruments,
that is, a greater reliance on competition to increase total market surplus. In partic-
ular, when regulatory schemes with many instruments are rigid because of legislative
or judicial constraints on regulatory discretion, it may be socially preferable to reduce
the number of instruments included in these schemes.
The results here must be generalized, so that a generic characterization of situa-
tions in which one regulatory regime or the other dominates can be made. Clearly
t h es i t u a t i o n si nw h i c ho n eo rt h eo t h e rr e g i m ed o m i n a t e sw o u l dc h a n g ei fw ew e r et o
assume diﬀerentiated products, price rather than quantity competition in the down-
stream market, or a larger number of ﬁrms. Finally, our result depends on an as-
sumption about the rigidity (incompleteness) of regulatory contracts; an important
goal would be to discover what extent of rigidity is necessary in order for light handed
regulatory schemes to be socially preferable.
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